Besmillah Taban[1]
Abstract
The Hazara community in Afghanistan has faced a long history of persecution, discrimination, and violence, dating back to the time of Abdur Rahman Khan (Amir of Afghanistan from 1880 to his death in 1901) and continuing into the present under the Taliban regime. Despite historical changes in government and legal systems, the treatment of Hazaras has remained marked by human rights abuses, including massacres, forced exclusions, and cultural oppressions. This article examines the situation of the Hazara people in 2024, under the Taliban regime, focusing on human rights, security, and access to public services. It highlights the Taliban’s ongoing discrimination against Hazaras, particularly their Shiite religious practices, which are seen as incompatible with the Taliban’s radical Sunni ideology. The article discusses the Taliban’s imposition of severe restrictions on Shiite religious ceremonies, forced dress codes, and the systematic removal of Hazaras from key societal positions. Additionally, it reports on the targeted killings, land grabs, and forced displacements of Hazaras. The lack of access to education and leadership roles, as well as the deliberate marginalization and violent attacks, underscore the deepening crisis for the Hazara community. The article also covers the mass migration of Hazaras due to security threats and rights violations, as well as the role of international organizations in addressing these abuses. In conclusion, the article stresses that, under the Taliban’s rule, the Hazara community remains at high risk of genocide, continued oppression, and cultural erasure.
Keywords: Hazara community, Taliban regime, persecution, genocide, Afghanistan.
Introduction
When we carefully examine the pages of contemporary Hazara history (at least from the time of Abdur Rahman Khan to the present), they reveal a tragic and recurring pattern of massacres, arrests, systemic discrimination, marginalization, forced exclusion, humiliation, and the confiscation of their lands. These historical accounts demonstrate that since the era of Abdur Rahman Khan, Hazaras have not been afforded the opportunity or space to live as equal citizens with the same rights as others in Afghanistan. Although the intensity of this oppression has fluctuated over time, acts of violence, human rights violations, and ultimately the systematic genocide of this ethnic group have persisted in various forms.
While governments have changed and laws have outwardly appeared more democratic—allowing Hazaras, in theory, to hold prominent state positions like the presidency or engage in political and social activities—discrimination and prejudice against them have remained deeply entrenched in practice. The systemic intent to target this ethnic group based on their ethnicity and religion (Shi’a Islam) has been embedded within societal attitudes and formal governmental structures. Throughout history, Hazaras have repeatedly been subjected to genocide, systematic discrimination, humiliation, and numerous acts of human rights violations by other Afghan citizens, state institutions, and jihadist militant groups.
With the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, Hazaras, as reflected in reports from credible national and international human rights organizations, including the Bolaq Analysts Network, have become even more vulnerable and are constantly exposed to genocide, human rights violations, discrimination, prejudice, and humiliation.
It is important to note that when we talk about the oppression Hazaras face or analyze the different layers of this oppression, expressed in various social and group behaviours, it is not meant to deny the oppression faced by other ethnic, gender, or professional groups under the Taliban regime. I am fully aware of the crimes committed by the Taliban against the people of Panjshir, Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan due to their support for the Afghan people’s freedom movements, the oppression of Afghan women for seeking their rights, and the discrimination against former security and defence forces, as well as civil and social activists across Afghanistan. I have repeatedly addressed these issues in my writings and interviews.
This article will examine the situation of the Hazara people in terms of human rights, security, and access to public services in 2024 under the Taliban regime, based on credible reports from national and international human rights organizations, media reports, and the experiences of victims.
Human Rights Situation of Hazaras
The policies and actions of the Taliban continue to be based on a radical interpretation of the Deobandi School and the Hanafi sect, which, according to their view, opposes much of the religious practices of Shiites (with Hazaras being primarily Shiite Ja’fari or Ismaili). In 2024, the Taliban imposed serious restrictions on Hazara Shiite religious ceremonies, especially during Muharram, including curbing freely held religious celebrations such as Eid al-Ghadeer and the 15th of Sha’ban (Laylat al-Bara’ah). While the Taliban claim these restrictions are for security purposes, ample evidence indicates that their intention is driven by Deobandi views and religious prejudice. For example, Ahmadullah Muttaqi, the head of the Taliban’s Information and Culture Department in Herat, referred to commemorations of the Battle of Karbala and the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (the third Shiite Imam) as innovations before the start of Muharram this year, in a speech attended by followers of the Shiite faith.
In several provinces, including Kabul, the Taliban issued guidelines on how to conduct mourning ceremonies during Muharram, imposing strict restrictions. The guidelines instructed Shiites to hold their ceremonies in closed rooms without the presence of Sunni followers and required a list of speakers to be shared in advance with Taliban. Such restrictions on Shiite religious ceremonies are unprecedented in Afghanistan in at least the last half-century, placing Hazaras under significant pressure to hold their religious observances.
In some cases, the Taliban have banned the import of Shiite religious books at land borders, especially at the Islam Qala border in Herat province with Iran. According to reliable media reports, in September 2024, the Taliban prevented the entry of books with Shiite religious content, even for personal use by individuals at the Islam Qala border.
Meanwhile, the Taliban have implemented stringent measures regarding compulsory dress codes in many Hazara-inhabited areas, which are in conflict with the cultural practices of the Hazara people. Several individuals have been arrested and tortured for failing to comply with these regulations. The dress code, especially for women, as prescribed by the Taliban’s law of “promotion of virtue and prevention of vice,” culturally contradicts the traditional attire of Hazara women. The imposition of this dress code gradually leads to the erosion of Hazara cultural values, which could be considered an example of cultural genocide.
The Taliban have repeatedly issued orders emphasizing the prohibition of Shiite religious teachings. In Badakhshan province, there are reports that the Taliban have intentionally forced Hazaras and Tajiks who follow Ismaili-Shiite to study Hanafi-Sunni religious books.
Due to their religious beliefs, the Taliban have denied Hazaras and Shiites the right to hold high positions in civil and security institutions. The current structure of the Taliban regime, according to available evidence and reports from credible international organizations, is dominated by men, mostly Pashtuns, and generally Sunni Muslims. Only a small number of Hazaras have been appointed to very low-level positions, lacking executive authority, and they serve merely as symbolic figures.
Richard Bennett, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, in his report during the 55th session of the Human Rights Council, described the human rights situation of the Hazaras as dire. He highlighted the detention and torture of Hazara and Tajik girls under the pretext of not adhering to the Taliban’s dress code, as well as the discrimination faced by Hazaras in legal disputes between Hazaras and Pashtun nomads/Kochis.
Furthermore, in the report released by the UN Human Rights Council on February 22, 2024, quoting a witness from the Hazara community, it is noted that the Taliban believe Hazaras are not true Muslims. The Taliban primarily detain girls from Hazara-majority areas of Kabul for not adhering to their dress code.
Due to widespread human rights violations and discrimination against Hazaras, a significant number of Hazara men and women were forced to leave Afghanistan in 2024 in search of safety in other countries. According to available information and conversations with many Hazara refugees who sought refuge in Pakistan and Iran due to security threats and rights violations by the Taliban, these individuals number in the thousands, most of whom are in extremely poor economic conditions and uncertain situations. This group of Hazara refugees, primarily consisting of civil society activists, those working in girls’ education, former members of security and defence forces, former government officials, elected representatives in institutions like the National and Provincial Councils, and social and media activists, are unable to return to Afghanistan due to their professional background and ethnic identity. On the other hand, many of these individuals, despite the possibility of forced deportation from Iran and Pakistan back to Afghanistan, have yet to receive any response from international organizations and host countries.
The Taliban have repeatedly sided with the Kuchi people in legal disputes, which are largely based on illegal claims and lack proper documentary evidence. These disputes, filed by the Kuchis, have resulted in Hazaras being forced to pay hefty fines or endure collective punishments. According to Amnesty International’s annual report, published on April 23, 2024, the Taliban have demanded substantial compensations from the Hazaras for claims made by the Kuchis, some of which date back 20 years.
Meanwhile, the Etilaat-e-Roz newspaper reported on December 25, 2024, that the Taliban intend to relocate the administrative center of Nawmesh District in Helmand Province, situated in a Hazara-populated area, to another region predominantly inhabited by Pashtuns. Analysts view this decision as a deliberate attempt to marginalize the Hazaras and weaken their local influence.
At the same time, credible media reports indicate that the Taliban plan to confiscate the Tor Bazaar in Dara-e-Suf District, Samangan Province, a Hazara-majority area, and hand it over to their affiliates. According to a report by Afghanistan International Television on December 22, 2024, this local Bazaar was established by Hazaras nearly a century ago in a Hazara-populated region, where over one hundred families currently reside nearby.
Security Situation of Hazaras
Continuous and deliberate insecurity continues to cast a shadow over every Hazara living under Taliban rule. Despite the Taliban’s repeated claims of providing security in Afghanistan, 2024 saw several targeted attacks against this ethnic and religious group across the country.
The Bolaq Analysts Network, a trusted organization documenting human rights violations and acts of genocide against Hazaras, has carefully recorded at least six terrorist attacks targeting the Hazara community in Afghanistan. These attacks claimed the lives of 32 people and injured 18 others, highlighting the ongoing threats and vulnerabilities faced by Hazaras under the Taliban regime.
Surce: Social media
In May 2024, ISIS conducted its first armed attack in Bamyan city, a province widely regarded as the political capital of the Hazara community. The attack targeted foreign tourists, resulting in the death and injury of several individuals. Later, in September 2024, ISIS claimed responsibility for another armed attack in the border region of Daykundi and Ghor provinces, located in central Afghanistan. This attack led to the killing of at least 14 Hazara men. In response, Human Rights Watch called on the international community to take action to protect the Hazara population.
Some analysts described these attacks in Hazara-populated areas as unprecedented and viewed them as evidence of the Taliban’s lack of intent or capability to protect the Hazara community. They expressed concerns that such attacks within Hazara territories could significantly harm the operations of international aid organizations and the tourism sector, which are critical to the local Hazara economy in Bamyan.
Furthermore, the presence of ISIS-Khorasan in Ghor province—home to a substantial Hazara population and geographically close to the Hazara-dominated provinces of Daykundi and Bamyan—represents a serious security threat to the Hazara community. Reports suggest that some former Taliban members in Ghor, as well as certain current Taliban affiliates, have collaborated with ISIS. Their knowledge of the local environment and transportation routes could enable them to create persistent and serious security threats for the Hazara people.
Although the Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K) has publicly claimed responsibility for most of these attacks, some analysts, citing the Taliban’s ideological stance against Hazaras and Shiites—such as the part of book by Mawlawi Noor Ahmad Islam Jar, the Taliban governor for Herat, who referred to Shiites as “Rafidah“—believe that the hands within the Taliban regime are involved in this massacre and genocide. The Taliban has yet to arrest or publicly identify the perpetrators of these attacks.
The Taliban have demolished Hazara-owned properties in western Kabul under the pretext of road construction without providing any alternative solutions to those affected, which violates previous legal norms. According to reports published on November 18, 2024, by several credible media outlets and research organizations (Lighthouse Reports, Afghan Witness, Etilaat Roz, Zan Times, and The Guardian), this action by the Taliban is described as deliberate, politically motivated, and aimed at forced displacement.
The reports also emphasized that the Taliban have offered no compensation to those who have suffered losses due to their decisions. This move has caused widespread psychological insecurity and homelessness among the Hazara community living in western Kabul.
Some individuals told me that after these areas were demolished, people connected to the Taliban exploited the desperation of the landowners, buying their properties at extremely low prices. Analysts believe that these demolitions, followed by the immediate appearance of buyers, are orchestrated efforts aimed at displacing Hazaras from their primary neighbourhoods and changing the demographic composition of western Kabul.
Although the Taliban attempts to portray security through its controlled media and social networks, Hazaras in many regions remain fearful of their security and the protection of their homes and land. Mohammad Amin (a pseudonym), a resident of Nahor district in Ghazni province, shared with me, “At any time, a nomad (Kochi) may come and make a false claim about something, like a missing sheep from years ago, and then the Taliban will conduct a mass arrest of us. This situation has put all of us in psychological insecurity.”
In another case, residents of the Kandir area in Gizab district of Urozgan province paid 27 million Afghanis due to a claim raised by Pashtuns, but based on a Taliban court decision, they were ordered to pay an additional 3 million Afghanis. The Etilaat-e-Roz newspaper reported on February 25, 2024, under the title “The People of Kandir Village and the Nightmare of Endless Bribery,” exposing the unjust decisions of the Taliban regarding the legal dispute between Hazara residents and their Pashtun neighbours. The report also noted that the Taliban has not responded to any complaints by Hazaras regarding the oppression and damage they have suffered. This situation has created total insecurity and hopelessness for the Hazaras in Gizab district. According to reliable reports, some analysts believe that this decision by the Taliban is aimed at further destabilizing the region and, ultimately, forcing Hazaras to leave.
At the same time, another investigative report, published by Kabul Now newspaper on January 23, 2024, under the title “Law of the Gun,” documents several cases of extortion and land grabbing of Hazara properties by Pashtuns with Taliban support.
There are also multiple credible reports indicating that the Taliban is seeking to create psychological insecurity by initiating illegal claims over Hazara lands in Bamiyan province as part of their strategy to marginalize and seize Hazara land.
In another move, the Taliban is building a new settlement in the Bagh Attar area of Qurbah Bagh district in Ghazni province, a region predominantly inhabited by Hazaras. This settlement is reported to be intended for members of al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. According to a detailed report by Hasht-e-Subh published on June 30, 2024, the settlement will consist of at least 1,000 homes, which are intended to be allocated to the Taliban’s foreign allies. Experts suggest that the construction of this settlement and the relocation of foreign terrorists—who share significant ideological and religious hostility toward the Hazara community—are part of the Taliban’s deliberate strategy to destabilize Hazara-majority areas. This action could ultimately facilitate the forced displacement of Hazaras from their ancestral land. A local resident, in conversation with me, revealed that community elders had repeatedly voiced their concerns about this settlement to Taliban authorities, but instead of any preventive measures, the elders were told their complaints were baseless. This dismissive attitude further exacerbates the sense of insecurity and injustice within the Hazara community.
Presence in the Regime Structure and Access to Public Services
As mentioned above, the Taliban regime consists of members of this group, and at the leadership level, they are entirely followers of Sunni Islam. According to the Taliban’s approach, Hazaras, due to their religious beliefs, cannot serve as ministers, governors, or hold general-level ranks. According to a research report by the Middle East Institute, there is no Hazara serving as a minister or governor in any structure of the Taliban regime. This limitation extends not only to administrative and military sectors but has recently been reported in credible media outlets, which indicate that the Taliban has decided to expel Hazaras from universities. On December 21, 2024, Etilaat Roz newspaper reported the systematic removal of Hazaras from their positions as professors at Bamyan University. The report mentions that the Taliban dismissed 41 Hazara professors, who held doctorate and master’s degrees, and replaced them with Taliban members and their supporters.
Meanwhile, the Taliban have transferred five Hazara professors from Bamyan University to the Higher Education Institute in Paktika province, an area predominantly inhabited by Pashtuns. Some analysts believe that this move is a tactic designed to permanently remove these professors. Since all the professors from Bamyan University are Hazara, they have no familiarity with the cultural and social environment of Paktika and, moreover, lack sufficient proficiency to teach at a university level in Pashto. This situation would likely prevent them from attending work, allowing the Taliban to dismiss them on the grounds of absenteeism.
Meanwhile, at the Malistan district office in Ghazni province, which is predominantly Hazara, only one Hazara individual holds a position in the Population Registration Office. The remaining Hazara employees have been dismissed, and in their place, members of the Taliban from other ethnic groups, mainly Pashtun, have been appointed. This situation has made access to services and communication between the citizens and the regime difficult, due to the lack of a common language and understanding.
In predominantly Hazara districts, the Taliban have appointed people who are largely unfamiliar with the local culture and language. Mullah Hafizullah Faizi, the Taliban-appointed district governor for Jaghori, is one such person who does not speak Persian, despite the fact that the entire population of the district is Hazara and speaks Persian. As a result, he often relies on an interpreter or compels the locals to speak Pashto, creating a significant communication barrier.
Daniel Watandar, a dual Afghan-British citizen who travelled to Afghanistan in August 2024, was detained by the Taliban and imprisoned for two months. In an interview with Afghanistan International TV, he spoke about his treatment by the Taliban members and the process of interrogation and trial: “The entire trial was conducted in Pashto, and I had no idea what was happening or what their decision regarding me was.”
This is an example of the situation regarding access to the Taliban’s regime and the treatment of Hazara people. The Taliban generally divides the people of Afghanistan into two categories: “us” and “them.” “Us” refers to members or supporters of the Taliban, and “them” refers to those who are outside this circle, regardless of ethnicity or gender. However, due to their ethnicity and faith, Hazaras are considered “more outside” the circle for the Taliban.
Although the Taliban regime ostensibly does not provide any services to the people of Afghanistan and focuses primarily on constructing mosques and religious Madrasa, as reported by their own publications, access to public services and humanitarian aid has been severely limited for Hazaras.
Multiple reports indicate that Hazaras, due to their lack of access to international humanitarian aid and services, have been forced to build schools, clinics, bridges, small dams, and water channels at their own expense. However, the Taliban either obstruct these community-driven activities or force the people to give bribes informally in order to continue these projects
For example, the residents of the Dawood area in the Jaghori district of Ghazni province were rebuilding a road from their area, connecting to the district of Maqar, with the help of local donations. The Taliban called them several times to the district and demanded a tax, or in fact, a form of bribe. Additionally, multiple reports indicate that the Taliban have requested money from these community projects, and some of these projects have been halted as a result. A report published by Hasht-e-Subh newspaper on December 7, 2024, highlighted the extortion by the Taliban from community projects in the Loman area and other villages in the Jaghori district, stating that the Taliban force people to pay 10% of the total project budget to the group’s administration.
Daniel Watandar also mentioned in his interview that the primary reason for his detention was the Taliban’s extortion of him for his involvement in a water dam project in the Anguri area of Jaghori with community donations.
Conclusion
The situation in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime is darker and more hopeless than ever before. Women are deprived of access to education, and skilled individuals have been stripped of job opportunities. The Taliban treat those who do not support them or belong to their circle in a severe and inhuman manner. The group has arrested and killed large numbers of young people due to their affiliation with the previous government or their connection to anti-Taliban factions in Kandahar and Helmand. In northern Afghanistan, illegal efforts to forcibly relocate residents, particularly Uzbeks and Tajiks, are underway. Dozens of individuals have been arrested and killed simply for coming from the provinces of Panjshir, Parwan, Kapisa, and Baghlan.
However, Among all these groups, the Hazaras find themselves in the worst situation, as due to their ethnicity and religion, they have become legitimate targets for radical jihadist groups like ISIS and the Taliban, who have a history and agenda rooted in extreme terrorism. The Hazaras face compounded and multifaceted oppression from both the ruling regime and groups aligned with it.
Despite the Taliban’s propaganda about ensuring security in Afghanistan, my findings through reviewing sources and talking to Hazara people inside Afghanistan reveal that this ethnic group remains one of the primary targets of killing and genocide by groups like the Taliban and ISIS. The Taliban alarmingly treats Hazaras as slaves with no right to determine their own fate. They issue strict directives for religious ceremonies, prohibit their religious education, and restrict access to their religious books. The Taliban have largely removed Hazaras from government offices and educational institutions and are attempting to forcibly expel them from society. Moreover, the Taliban have decided on several occasions to relocate or seize administrative centers and markets/Bazaars located in Hazara-majority areas. These actions are aimed at marginalizing the Hazaras.
The Taliban predominantly deprives Hazaras of access to humanitarian aid, and international organizations, under the influence of the Taliban’s policies, have given the least attention to the Hazara people in terms of humanitarian support (food, small businesses, agriculture and livestock, healthcare, and education) over the past three years.
The Hazara people, due to the Taliban’s harsh and discriminatory policies, have been forced to flee Afghanistan in large numbers, seeking refuge in distant and neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Iran, where they continue to receive minimal international support in terms of protection or resettlement to third countries. Despite the widespread oppression faced by the people of Afghanistan, the Hazaras, due to enduring discrimination, fanaticism, and ongoing organized killings in the past, along with the intensification of such behaviours by the Taliban and ISIS, urgently require sustained attention from international organizations and human rights bodies. Currently, the Hazaras consistently urge the international community to recognize their situation as genocide based on existing evidence, to hold the perpetrators accountable in fair trials, and to protect them from the atrocities of the Taliban.
As a final point, in my opinion, if immediate and necessary attention is not given to the situation of vulnerable groups in Afghanistan, including women, Hazaras, other religious groups such as Hindus and Sikhs, civil and social activists, and members of the former security and defence forces, the ruthless killings of Hazaras, which clearly amount to genocide, will continue. Moreover, the detention and vengeance against former security forces, the arrest, disappearance, and killing of civil activists and women’s rights defenders, as well as the forced and mass displacement of Hazaras and Hindus, will further escalate.
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[1] Besmillah Taban is a Ph.D. student in Political and Public Administration Sciences, specializing in Security Studies at JU. He serves as a member of the executive board of the Bolaq Analysts Network and is the head of its research team. Previously, he worked as the General Director of Afghanistan’s Crime Investigation Department (CID). He can be reached on X (formerly Twitter) @BesmillahTaban.